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Abstract
Background: The severity of COVID-19, as well as the speed and scale of its spread, has posed a global challenge.
Countries around the world have implemented stringent non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) to control
transmission and prevent health systems from being overwhelmed. These NPI have had profound negative social
and economic impacts. With the timeline to worldwide vaccine roll-out being uncertain, governments need to
consider to what extent they need to implement and how to de-escalate these NPI. This rapid review collates de-
escalation criteria reported in the literature to provide a guide to criteria that could be used as part of de-escalation
strategies globally.
Methods: We reviewed literature published since 2000 relating to pandemics and infectious disease outbreaks. The
searches included Embase.com (includes Embase and Medline), LitCovid, grey literature searching, reference
harvesting and citation tracking. Over 1,700 documents were reviewed, with 39 documents reporting de-escalation
criteria included in the final analysis. Concepts retrieved through a thematic analysis of the included documents
were interlinked to build a conceptual dynamic de-escalation framework.
Results: We identified 52 de-escalation criteria, the most common of which were clustered under surveillance
(cited by 43 documents, 10 criteria e.g. ability to actively monitor confirmed cases and contact tracing), health
system capacity (cited by 30 documents, 11 criteria, e.g. ability to treat all patients within normal capacity) and
epidemiology (cited by 28 documents, 7 criteria, e.g. number or changes in case numbers).
De-escalation is a gradual and bi-directional process, and resurgence of infections or emergence of variants of
concerns can lead to partial or full re-escalation(s) of response and control measures in place. Hence, it is crucial to
rely on a robust public health surveillance system.
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Conclusions: This rapid review focusing on de-escalation within the context of COVID-19 provides a conceptual
framework and a guide to criteria that countries can use to formulate de-escalation plans.
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Introduction
As of early June 2021, there have been over 170 m cases
globally and over 3.7 m deaths attributed to COVID-19,
the disease caused by a novel strain of the coronavirus.
[1] On February 3rd 2020 the World Health
Organization (WHO) published a Strategic preparedness
and response plan for COVID-19, based on mitigating
the pandemic by limiting human-to-human transmis-
sion: this is done by reducing international spread, redu-
cing social contacts and isolating infected patients. [2]
The two key strategies in pandemic control are mitiga-
tion and suppression. [3] Mitigation centres on the
concept of “flattening the curve”, where the overall
number of cases is distributed over a greater period
of time, allowing the health system to respond within
its capacity. [3, 4] Suppression aims to reduce the
number of cases through the use of intensive non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) such as physical
distancing and school closures until effective counter-
measures – either treatment or vaccine – are avail-
able. [5] At the start of the pandemic, some countries
began by introducing mitigation measures, while most
moved to an approach that blends mitigation and
suppression. [3] A limited number of countries such
as Australia, followed a CVID-Zero approach through
complete shutdown for a period of time, followed by
almost-complete borders closure. [6] Introducing such
strict measures raises ethical, social, political, eco-
nomic and legal issues that must be considered to en-
sure their feasibility and sustainability. [7, 8]
Physical distancing is the “first line of defence” against
outbreaks of novel strains for which there is not yet a
vaccine or effective treatment, when it is activated with-
out delay and maintained for a relatively long period. [9,
10] While a number of vaccines effective against
COVID-19 have been developed, approved, and are be-
ing rolled out, there remains huge uncertainty around
the timeline for a worldwide effective vaccination cover-
age, with physical distancing in place for anywhere be-
tween 25 and 70 % of that time. [3, 11, 12] The strict
lockdown measures during this pandemic come with in-
herent social and economic consequences. In some
places and industries, lockdown has led to a virtual shut-
down, increasing the financial burden on governments
to support people through welfare (unemployment and
furlough support), as well as seeing surges in interper-
sonal violence and potential mental health impacts. [13–
18] An indefinite timeline for a return to normal or a
“new normal” puts public compliance at risk as strict
NPI become socially, politically and economically un-
acceptable and unviable. [3, 8, 12, 19, 20] However, we
have seen two additional major threats during the
COVID-19 pandemic: first, there is a risk of resurgence
when interventions are de-escalated, and second, the
unanimity of control measures and public health inter-
ventions has led to the emergence of more transmissible
variants of concerns, including some that are vaccine-
escaping, from the original SARS-CoV-2wildtype. [3, 4,
11, 21] This creates an imperative for governments to
use transparent criteria that allow NPI to be de-
escalated and re-escalated in response to the changing
epidemiological situation.
Thresholds for signalling the start and end of a pan-
demic and for escalating response measures within a
pandemic are frequently described in national pandemic
planning documentation. [22, 23] However, criteria for
de-escalating responses are less clear – aside from the
implicit suggestion that they are the opposite of the es-
calation criteria. Hence, we reviewed the literature to
identify de-escalation criteria and developed a concep-
tual framework that policy makers could follow to plan
their de-escalation strategies through the continued, as
well as future pandemics.
Methods
The scope of this review was to identify documents re-
lating to the de-escalation of interventions introduced in
response to, or included in planning documents for pan-
demics or infectious disease outbreaks, published from
2000 onwards. No geographic or language limits were
applied.
Searching
An initial search took place in April 2020 and focused
on combining terms around the key concepts – infec-
tious disease outbreaks/pandemics and de-escalation.
Search terms per database are detailed in Additional file
1 pp 1–3. Initially the plan was to use an all-hazards ap-
proach to investigate triggers for de-escalation in the
broader disaster-preparedness literature. However, scop-
ing revealed that this approach retrieved a large volume
of material with limited applicability to infectious disease
pandemics (for example, physical rebuilding following
earthquakes).
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The main issue was that no single term is consistently
used in the literature to refer to the concept of “de-escal-
ation”. Indeed, we identified over 30 distinct terms used
to describe de-escalation, with different terminology
used within the same documents. The terms that are
used to describe this concept are also not unique to pub-
lic health or emergency preparedness, so it was challen-
ging to design a search strategy that balances sensitivity
and precision. For the purposes of this report, we se-
lected the term “de-escalation” as it is used by the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC). [23, 24]
The Initial scoping revealed that bibliographic data-
bases were unlikely to yield the documents relevant to
the review because of a lack of standard language and
appropriate thesaurus headings. Hence, we approached
the literature from different angles, using different ap-
proaches and a range of sources (Table 1). We repeated
the search in June 2021. This time, the search yielded a
higher number of peer-reviewed manuscripts related to
the topic, and COVID-19-related, and hence no search
of the grey literature was preformed again for the period
of April 2020 – June 2021.
Sifting
Literature retrieved from bibliographic databases was
sifted first based on title and abstract, then based on ab-
stract and/or full text, based on the criteria below:
 Title/abstract sift, documents were included if they
met the following criteria:
– Date limits – from 2000.
– Event type – pandemic or infectious disease
outbreak.
 Abstract/full text sift, documents were included if
they met the following criteria:
– Cross-border/international infectious disease
outbreak.
– Describe the national response to an international
infectious disease outbreak.
– Included reference to de-escalation.
 At the data extraction stage, documents were
included if they met the following criteria:
– Reported de-escalation criteria.
Analysis
Data analysis began with a standardised data extraction
form created for this project, capturing the following
information:
 Setting – country, year, health system type.
 Type of hazard, risk, emergency or event.
 The de-escalation decision-making process – for ex-
ample, what triggers were used, thresholds reached
etc.
 The de-escalation process – what measures/inter-
ventions were removed? When and how?
 Outcomes of de-escalation – was de-escalation
deemed “successful”? Was there a need for the re-
introduction of de-escalated interventions?
Framework development
We followed the method proposed by Jabareen in 2009
to develop a conceptual framework for de-escalation of
NPI following infectious disease outbreaks. [28] A con-
ceptual framework provides an interpretative approach –
hence an understanding, instead of a theoretical explan-
ation – to social reality. Concepts, represented in boxes,
were retrieved from the thematic analysis of the included
documents and interlinked based on the components
originating from the previous or the following concepts
in a logical sequence.
Results
Of a total of 1,762 documents identified, 39 reported de-
escalation criteria and were hence included in the ana-
lysis. Figure 1 details the identified, screened, eligible
and analysed documents. The 39 fully analysed docu-
ments are listed in Additional file 2 pp 1, clustered by
the type of document. In these documents, de-escalation
was described as selective, phased or adaptive. Selective
de-escalation is selective based on either demography or
geography – identifying groups of people or areas that
are high- or low-risk, so that interventions can be de-
escalated for those in the low-risk categories. Phased de-
escalation refers to a process that is graduated, so
Table 1 Search process of the literature on de-escalation
strategies of non-pharmaceutical interventions following an
infectious disease outbreak
1. Grey literature searches to include unindexed sources of information
from institutional websites such as the US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control (ECDC) and WHO [25]
2. Advanced searching techniques such as citation tracking and
reference harvesting from key documents
3. Searches in the specialist COVID-19 source LitCovid [26]
4. Searches in Embase.com (which includes Embase and Medline)
bibliographic database (covering the biomedical, public health and
disaster literature) on April 8th 2020 and Scopus
5. Review of the list of rapid reviews prepared externally for WHO
(unpublished, updated April 9th 2020)
6. The University of Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker
[27]
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interventions are partially or fully de-escalated and not
all at once, with continued to monitoring to ensure that
there is no adverse effect on case numbers.
In total we identified 52 criteria recommended to con-
sider for de-escalating NPIs (Fig. 2). We clustered under
the surveillance system capacity, health system capacity,
isolation capacity, disease epidemiology, disease know-
ledge, variability in settings, and community engage-
ment/behaviour.
Most reported surveillance, health system capacity and
epidemiology -based criteria
The analysis of documents reporting de-escalation cri-
teria highlighted a range of criteria based on epidemi-
ology, disease knowledge, and healthcare, surveillance,
setting-specific, isolation and community capacity. The
most commonly reported categories of de-escalation cri-
teria were surveillance, health system capacity and
epidemiology-based criteria.
Ten criteria were grouped as surveillance-based de-
escalation criteria and cited by 43 documents. These
criteria focused on the ability to monitor confirmed
cases and contact tracing, [8, 12, 19, 24, 29–35] the
assessment of susceptibility in a population, [8, 19,
24, 31, 35–39] as well as on capacity of testing all
with symptoms, [8, 19, 29–31, 36–38, 40] the ability
for large scale testing, [33, 35, 38, 41] or the ability
to detect suspect cases. [29, 31, 36, 37] Less often
cited criteria were the upscaling of manpower for
testing, [39, 42] the ability to react to a changing out-
break situation, [43] the centrally coordinated contact
tracing [44] or the surveillance of mortality rates [38]
and hospital admissions. [38]
In terms of health system capacity, 30 documents
named one or more of the eleven de-escalation cri-
teria. Within these health system capacity criteria, the
ability to treat all patients within normal capacity was
the most commonly reported criteria, [8, 19, 30, 32,
40, 45] followed by sufficient PPE for health/social
workers and/or the public [8, 19, 29, 36, 38] and the
capacity to provide effective countermeasures such as
antivirals and vaccines. [40, 46–49] Intensive care unit
(ICU) capacity was also a specific consideration with
the reported criteria, such as ICU cases dropping
below a defined threshold and the ability to redistrib-
ute ICU patients between units to manage capacity.
[3, 11, 12, 46] One study also named hospital surveil-
lance systems to prevent the generation of hospital
outbreaks and robust core program of infection pre-
vention and control. [38]
Seven epidemiology-based de-escalation criteria were
found and cited by 28 documents. These criteria focused
Fig. 1 PRISMA flow diagram of the review of de-escalation of non-pharmaceutical interventions following infectious disease outbreaks for the
searches of April 2020 and June 2021 combined
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on achieving a threshold of case numbers that were re-
ported as “acceptable” in the local context; in some
cases, specific numbers per 10,000 or 100,000 were re-
ported, but this was not consistent. [12, 29, 34, 35, 40,
41, 44, 50–52] Observing a “consistent” decrease in the
number of confirmed cases was also a commonly re-
ported criteria, but specific thresholds were not reported.
[8, 32, 46, 53, 54] Other criteria included decreases in
the number of new cases over the disease incubation
period [30, 34, 38, 55, 56] and an overall decrease in the
number of deaths; again, thresholds were not specified.
[3, 30, 55] Three documents reported using virus trans-
mission rates (Rt) as a criteria [33, 35, 52] and one using
full containment and suppressed epidemic or natural
herd immunity. [47]
Setting-, disease knowledge-, community- and isolation-
based criteria
The ability to identify regions for selective de-escalation
based on geography was reported within setting-specific
capacity. [3, 11, 19, 20, 36] For the re-opening of work-
places, the implementation of feasible measures in line
with the principles of the current non-pharmaceutical in-
terventions in place were recommended by the WHO and
others. [31, 38, 42] Other setting-specific criteria included
those referring to re-opening schools either after a fixed
period (a modelling simulation study) or when infection
control, testing, task force or temperature check measures
are in place. [19, 42, 53, 57] Managing the risk of imported
cases during de-escalation by ensuring that sufficient mea-
sures are in place to detect and manage suspect cases
among travellers was also reported. [31, 38] Ensuring that
transmission control in areas that are de-escalating re-
mains sufficient to prevent transmission to areas still
under full restrictions was also reported as a criteria to
consider in geography-based selective de-escalation. [11]
Low and middle-income countries should focus on criteria
such as free point- of care targeted and demand driven
testing among asymptomatic individuals [58] and the
provision of facilities for quarantine and isolation for
people unable to safely do so in their homes. [38]
Disease knowledge-based criteria focused on the ability
to identify high- and low-risk regions or groups for se-
lective de-escalation based on demography. [8, 11, 19,
20, 24, 31, 36] Two manuscripts specifically focused on
an evidence-based approach for de-escalation. [34, 58]
Knowledge about the effectiveness of control measures,
including their relative effectiveness for high-risk groups,
was also a criterion for de-escalation. [24] Additional cri-
teria were the knowledge of key drivers for transmission
and their control. [43] The establishemnt of regional
centres of expertise to share knowledge was reported as
an important approach to inform de-escalation. [8]
Community-based criteria included engagement of
communities to ensure understanding on how to con-
tribute to the de-escalation process [31, 38, 42, 43, 58],
Fig. 2 Heat map of criteria suggested for de-escalation of non-pharmaceutical interventions following infectious disease outbreaks
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as an important component of pandemic response. One
paper also recommended that the use of facial masks be
rolled out to the general public [31] and that prevention
in general should be promoted within communities. [58]
The WHO also specifically discussed isolation cap-
acity, in terms of ensuring that countries have the ability
to isolate all confirmed cases and their close contacts,
whether in their homes or healthcare settings. [31] One
other study underlined the ability to isolate at least 25%
of all cases. [59]
Process and outcomes of de-escalation of non-
pharmaceutical interventions
Three documents specified details of the process of de-
escalation. The European Centre for Disease Prevention
and Control (ECDC) states that countries should assess
whether surveillance and monitoring is robust enough to
detect any possible infection resurgence before consider-
ing de-escalating any non-pharmaceutical interventions.
[24] One document specified that the “re-opening of so-
ciety should be staged according to the local situation”,
and further detailed a four-stage approach of gradual re-
opening. [38] The gradual re-opening steps were
dependent on the observation of hospital admissions
and performance of testing of all symptomatic persons
for two weeks.
The Australian Department of Health described key
activities within the de-escalation process: [45]
 Support and maintain quality care.
 Cease response interventions that are no longer
needed.
 Transition response interventions to seasonal or
interim arrangements.
 Monitor for a second wave of the outbreak.
 Monitor for the development of antiviral resistance.
 Communicate to support the return from pandemic
to normal business services.
 Evaluate systems and revise plans and procedures.
Our review also sought to identify evidence on the
outcomes of de-escalation of interventions, for example
on the number of cases. Such information – beyond a
theoretical risk of unquantified “resurgence” – was close
to null in the over 1,700 documents reviewed. Only one
observational study in Israel showed a gradual increase
of the SARS-CoV-2 incidence following the re-opening
of schools without an increase in COVID-19 associated
hospitalizations and deaths. [60] Another example from
Hong Kong reported an abrupt community outbreak
after lifting restrictions on physical distancing and the
reopening of schools. [56] One document – a theoretical
de-escalation plan – stated that a sustained rise in new
cases over five days or the exceeding of hospital capacity
could be outcomes of de-escalation that trigger the
re-escalation of non-pharmaceutical interventions. [30]
Proposed Dynamic de-escalation framework
The proposed Dynamic de-escalation framework is rep-
resented in Fig. 3. It is designed to provide a guide to
government and public health agencies on how to de-
escalate NPI. The framework provides a transparent
process with clear criteria that aims to balance epi-
demiological, social, political and economic consider-
ation. Decision and review points are included
throughout to enable a dynamic process that can re-
spond to changing circumstances as an outbreak pro-
gresses and provide a response that is appropriate to the
current situation.
Start of the de-escalation process
The start of the process defined by the framework can
be prompted by the downward epidemiological shift of
the outbreak, reaching a zero- or close-to-zero-case situ-
ation, the social rejection of NPI, or the economic
deterioration due to the NPI. Community engagement is
one of the key pillars of health emergency response and
fundamental for the successful implementation of
response measures by ensuring that communities are
informed and equipped to play their part. [31] Hence,
before moving to decision-making, it is important that
key stakeholders, specifically those that work closely
with their communities such as grassroot or
community-based organisations, are engaged to ensure
that all perspectives are considered in selecting and
prioritising de-escalation criteria. [61] Following a par-
ticipatory approach to decision-making can ensure buy-
in and increase adherence to decisions taken. Once the
decision has been made to transition to de-escalation,
the next step is to assess and communicate the epi-
demiological situation. Well-thought risk communica-
tion strategies should deliver concise, useful, and
appropriate messaging relative not only to the epidemio-
logical situation, but also to protective measures and
social responsibility. At this point, the appropriate stake-
holders need to map and review the NPIs currently in
place.
Designing a de-escalation strategy
Once NPIs are mapped and reviewed, stakeholders can
decide which criteria to use in determining which NPI
to de-escalate, where, and at what pace. Specifically,
stakeholders have to consider their original pandemic
control model in terms whether they have chosen a
“COVID-Zero” or a “living with COVID” approach.
Considerations in terms of de-escalation would be differ-
ent for these two approaches. For instance, countries
that have chosen a COVID-Zero approach might place a
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higher emphasis on cross-country transmission and
hence, border control measures, might be the last to de-
escalate, if at all.
The reviewed literature points mostly to public health
surveillance and health system capacity, as well as epi-
demiological criteria such as the ability to monitor con-
firmed cases and contacts, [8, 12, 19, 24, 29–35] the
ability to treat all patients within normal capacity, [8, 19,
30, 32, 40, 45] or reaching an acceptable number of dis-
ease cases [12, 29, 34, 35, 40, 41, 44, 50–52] prior to de-
escalating NPIs. When selecting NPIs for the de-
escalation strategy, it is crucial to evaluate the data rela-
tive to chosen criteria. Each potential criterion should be
carefully considered by assessing the sources of the data
used to measure this criterion. When data sources for a
criterion are not deemed reliable, it might be better to
consider alternative criteria with more reliable data
sources. Further, the selection of criteria and definition
of thresholds should be guided by the dynamics of the
pandemic, the social/economic context and the local
outbreak situation within individual countries. Hence,
we include criteria in the framework that reflect those in
the literature, but we do not make recommendations or
specifications on the selection and definition of de-
escalation criteria using specific thresholds. To the ex-
tent possible, such thresholds should cover the possible
outcomes of the decision-making process: what happens
in case of no de-escalation, of selective de-escalation, of
total de-escalation and of re-escalation.
Once criteria are selected, a gradual, rather than a one-
time, approach of lifting NPIs is recommended. [38] This
gradual approach gives the potential to be adaptive and
pro-active with the changing outbreak situation while bal-
ancing health system capacity with data from surveillance
systems. Epidemiological thresholds can thirdly contribute
to a clear picture and classification of this balance. The
strategy should consider which NPIs, and what pace
should be de-escalated. The strategy should also be
adapted to each specific setting, the potential risk groups,
and the geographical areas. For instance, the de-escalation
strategy in the case of COVID-19, cannot be similar be-
tween health care facilities responsible mainly for older
Fig. 3 Dynamic de-escalation framework for non-pharmaceutical interventions following infectious disease outbreaks
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persons in a high-incidence area, and schools in an area
where incidence is close to zero.
Implementation of a bi-directional de-escalation strategy
The implementation of the de-escalation strategy should
be accompanied with a continuous monitoring and ana-
lysis of surveillance data together with the status of the
health system capacity and epidemiological benchmarks
to enable a permanent assessment of the situation – that
is, whether a balance between these criteria has been
reached, and how and whether de-escalation should
proceed in a gradual process. If the epidemiological situ-
ation is stable or improved, further review of NPIs in
place, and further consideration of de-escalation criteria
and strategies can be considered. On the other hand, if
the epidemiological situation is worsened or unstable,
stakeholders should promptly consider re-instating some
of all NPIs. Indeed, during this pandemic, we have seen
at least two waves in any of the affected regions, in
addition to the emergence of several variants of concerns
proven less susceptible to the approved vaccines. [21]
The de-escalation decision-making process is hence
not a one-time event – it will require review and revi-
sion as the situation evolves and circumstances change.
The review of the de-escalation decision can be
prompted by time, for example some governments have
used two weeks as a review period, as it encompasses
the disease incubation period [62] and emergence of
symptoms to give a more accurate reflection of current
case numbers. Prompts can also include changes in the
routinely collected epidemiological data, such as in-
creases or decreases in case numbers, or changes in
healthcare utilisation (for example, increases or de-
creases in hospital or ICU admissions). Here again, com-
munity engagement along with a well-though risk
communication strategy should be an integral part of
this process.
Discussion
We have screened over 1,700 documents at title and ab-
stract or full text for de-escalation criteria for of NPI fol-
lowing infectious disease outbreak. Only 39 documents
included de-escalation criteria for these NPI. This rapid
review indicates that de-escalation is a bi-directional and
gradual process whereby NPI are partially or fully de-
escalated and can be re-escalated. Such a decision-
making process should be informed throughout by ro-
bust public health surveillance data, balanced with social,
political and economic considerations. Policy makers,
along with their stakeholders, need to define context-
relevant and socially-acceptable criteria to start the de-
escalation process for each of the implemented NPI.
Thresholds for each of the selected criteria have to also
be contextually-defined and bi-directional. Throughout
this process, decision-making should rely on a continued
monitoring and use of multi-outcome surveillance data,
paralleled with a constant evaluation of de-escalation
effect indicators by intervention which should be defined
as well.
The risk of subsequent wave(s) of epidemic infections
cannot be removed entirely – unless countries opt to
impose strict NPI until herd immunity is reached or en-
tire populations are vaccinated. This is unfeasible as
worldwide vaccine coverage only slowly increases while
at the same time vaccine-escaping variants start appear-
ing. Therefore, a key component of de-escalation plan-
ning becomes mitigating the risk of resurgence by
ensuring that there is sufficient surveillance capacity to
detect increases in the number of cases at an early stage,
and health system capacity to cope and control the out-
break. [4, 8, 20, 24, 29, 31, 32, 45]
This review identified only one observational study
that evaluated the impact or effectiveness of de-
escalation, beyond the theoretical risk of resurgence.
The retrieved evidence therefore is mainly based on
mathematical models or grey literature. Notably, we
found no evidence for a specific sequence of de-
escalation of NPI, but only a proposed gradual four-
stage de-escalation scheme. [38] Apart from this docu-
ment, there was no evidence-based criteria to prioritize
specific measures for early vs. late de-escalation. If such
a list of priorities would exist, however, it would most
likely be related to a specific cultural and societal back-
ground and thus not be generally applicable. While the
sequence of de-escalation should be a result of an open
societal discussion, it seems to be advisable to only sus-
pend mitigation measures stepwise and gradually, so that
the effects can be clearly attributed.
By the time this review was completed, the published
peer-reviewed literature relevant to COVID-19 had not
yet heavily focused on vaccine rollout. As vaccine roll-
out is ongoing worldwide, we expect surveillance and
health system capacity-related criteria to include moni-
toring of the population’s vaccination coverage as well as
the ability to promptly distribute vaccines to the
population.
A dynamic, fit-for-purpose response
The fragile success of COVID-19 mitigation is con-
stantly threatened by the risk of a subsequent wave(s)
and the emergence of variants of concerns until a vac-
cine or effective antiviral treatment has been secured.
Until then, an approach to de-escalation that responds
to the changing social, economic and epidemiological
situation, is needed. This is reflected in the Dynamic
de-escalation framework devised based on this research.
El Bcheraoui et al. Globalization and Health          (2021) 17:106 Page 8 of 11
Reviews of influenza pandemic preparedness plans and
the response to the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic highlighted
the need for plans that are dynamic, as the consensus
was that plans were based on a worst-case scenario and
struggled to adapt to suit a less severe outbreak. [63–65]
An unintended consequence of this reflection is that
some countries have experienced difficulty in adapting
plans to deal with the more serious scenario of COVID-
19. The focus on influenza as the probable source of
future pandemics may also have left the world in-
adequately prepared for COVID-19 when the disease did
not follow the same dynamics as influenza. [19]
Reflecting on the COVID-19 and H1N1 experience, it
is clear that pandemic planning needs to consider a var-
iety of scenarios and epidemiological characteristics to
enable a more agile response to future outbreaks. In-
cluding criteria for the escalation and de-escalation of
outbreak response measures in pandemic plans enables
their flexible implementation, with the timing, extent
and use of interventions tailored to the severity of the
outbreak at hand and factoring in other considerations
such as social acceptability and the economic impact of
NPI. [23, 65]
Selective de-escalation
Selective de-escalation of interventions – either by geog-
raphy (low-incidence areas), by social setting or demo-
graphic group (low-risk groups) – could enable
countries to keep case numbers within a manageable
number whilst balancing the health, social and economic
impacts of NPI. This approach is predicated on sufficient
knowledge about the disease to be able to identify high-
and low-risk groups. [8, 11, 19, 20, 24, 31, 36] Testing
capacity is also a pre-requisite to any de-escalation strat-
egy to mitigate the risk of resurgence, something which
many countries have struggled with. Selective de-
escalation and re-escalation is an approach that is now
being widely implemented.
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of individual
NPI, because they are usually deployed as a package of
measures. [66] The timing of the introduction of NPI
and measures contributes to the initial success and sus-
tainability of these interventions, by ensuring community
compliance. [8, 67] However, the basic truth that we
cannot manage what we cannot measure implies that we
need to evaluate whether NPI lead to the intended
change. We don´t have this evidence for most of the
COVID-19 mitigation measures.
This rapid review has some limitations. First, there is
the possibility that this rapid review missed potentially
relevant papers. We attempted to mitigate this risk
through the use of a multi-faceted search approach not
solely reliant on text-based searching. Standardising of
terminology would improve the efficiency and accuracy
of future research.
Second, while we did not limit the results to English lan-
guage in our search, we used English language search
terms only, meaning that the results would have been
skewed towards English language documents. This was a
pragmatic decision to enable a rapid review of the litera-
ture. On the opposite side, this rapid review included a
wide range of documents, not limited to the scientific
literature, this decision was taken in light of the rapidly
evolving situation to enable the reviewers to consider
emerging views on de-escalation of COVID-19 related
NPI. Two researchers independently grouped all retrieved
criteria in seven main domains. However, as there is no
scientifically recognized framework, this grouping is not
conclusively objective. Criteria such as “Risk of imported
cases managed” could be either placed in surveillance but
also in setting-specific criteria as the specify points of entry.
Nevertheless, there remains room for discussion on devel-
oping additional domains or creating other sub-criteria.
Conclusions
This rapid review of de-escalation criteria incorporated
COVID-19 and previous infectious disease outbreaks
and planning exercises. De-escalation is not a single ac-
tivity, rather it is a bi-directional, dynamic process
driven by changes in public health surveillance data that
can lead to the partial or full re-escalation(s) of response
and control measures. Our Dynamic de-escalation
framework reflects this.
This rapid review has highlighted limited specific
information or guidance for countries in selecting and
defining de-escalation criteria, hence the need for the
criteria and framework that we have devised. While
escalation criteria – to define the start of a pandemic or
within pandemic phases – are often reported, de-
escalation criteria are rare beyond the inference that they
are the opposite of the escalation criteria. Such criteria
also require clear national definition informed by the
evidence from epidemiological data and social and eco-
nomic acceptability.
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